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Abstract
We present lessons learned from using mechanical theorem proving for proof support
in software verication, with trusted execution of programs in mind. We will use two
realistic running examples, compiler verication, which is central if we want to prove
that we can trust a piece of executable software, and an industrial project in which
we proved the correctness of a safety critical expert system using (veried) runtime
result verication. We will emphasize the role of partial program correctness and its
preservation. And we will comment on high level control aspects, in particular on
what we can and what we will not be able to prove for a concrete piece of executable
software.
1 Introduction
Our paper is about software verication, i.e., about proving properties of pro-
grams which we want to guarantee in order to trust in program execution. But
how can we mechanically verify executable machine programs? Will we ever
be able to prove non-trivial correctness properties of realistic executable ma-
chine programs and furthermore check the proofs using theorem provers? Or
should we better transfer such attempts into Wittgenstein's domain of logical
scepticism, arguing that no way of reasoning will ever lead towards convincing
solutions |hence just give up? Our answer is no. There are solutions. But
since we denitely will not succeed to verify large programs semantically on
machine code level (at least not in an engineering style), we have to modularize
the problem. Hence, our paper is about source level verication of programs
and compiler verication.
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In spite of the problems mentioned above, there is a high risk either to
formulate theorems which are simply not true, or (practically) not provable,
or useless. Therefore, a major goal will be to show what we can and what we
cannot expect to be able to prove for a realistic piece of executable software.
We will emphasize the importance of partial program correctness (cf. [19,22])
and its preservation, i.e., of a correctness guarantee for regularly computed
non-erroneous results also of machine executables. This is often suÆcient, very
practical, and sometimes surprisingly easy to prove, even rigorously, formally
and mechanically.
We do not believe that the entire work necessary for a convincing software
correctness proof can be \push button", i.e., fully mechanical and automatic.
We have to think about what to prove and how to prove it, tasks which are
very similar to those proposed to successfully manage software engineering
processes. We have to analyze requirements, think about the architecture and
the design of proofs, and nally we have to implement them using a particular
theorem prover. Additional work is necessary to produce a consistent and
complete proof documentation in order to convince our customers and help
them to believe both in the formalization and in the proof.
If we do not want to verify programs on machine code level, we have to
trust in compilers. Their executable implementations have to guarantee that
correctness properties of source programs are preserved, so that we can trust
in the correctness of the generated target programs. But note that this opens
up a similar question for the compiler and its implementation, which is a
piece of (executable) software that we want to trust. In order to avoid cir-
culi vitiosi, i.e., never ending dependencies on unsafe executable software (of
uncertain pedigree, [21]), we need for principle reasons some manual proof
checking. Fortunately, we can push this eort entirely into compiler imple-
mentation correctness proofs and rigorously verify compiler executables to
preserve adequate and reasonable correctness properties of source programs
[17].
We want to demonstrate the proposed modularization in source level and
compiler correctness. For that we use two examples which t together. In
section 2 we sketch an industrial project on the verication of a safety-critical
expert system. Its correctness proof has actually been checked by the ACL2
theorem prover [24]. Safety can be proved by a technique which we call (veri-
ed) runtime result verication [13]. In section 3 we informally collect requi-
rements for realistic correct compilation. Section 4 will yield a mathematical
framework which enables us to precisely dene compiler correctness by preser-
vation of source program correctness. In particular, we will sketch a mecha-
nical proof of preservation of partial correctness for a toy compiler in ACL2
(section 5). The role of toy examples is crucial in order to nally succeed, and
we will give some comments in section 6. We will end up with some lessons
learned and some wishes for theorem provers used in software verication.
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2 Veried Runtime Result Verication
The eort of proving the correctness of large software systems seems often
not justiable. Heuristics and programming tricks are necessary in order to to
solve complex problems successfully and eÆciently. Mathematical induction
then often fails because the algorithms to be veried get too complex and
tricky. This applies in particular to knowledge-based systems. However, if
such systems are safety- or mission-critical, we rely on their correctness.
In [13] we propose a checker-based approach to software verication which
exploits the idea of runtime result checking [4] for verication. It is app-
licable if partial correctness of the application suÆces. Partial correctness
can be proved by a-posteriori runtime result verication. Let us sketch an
industrial software verication project [3] in which we exploit the technique
of veried runtime result verication (checker-based program verication) in
order to prove the correctness (soundness) of a safety-critical expert system.
The system is called Relais Master [1,25], and it is an expert system for com-
puting test-plans for relay assembly groups that control railway systems. It is
used in the engineering phase of such devices in order to (more automatically)
provide support for hardware-in-the-loop tests. The test-plans are generated
from circuit descriptions. Later, they are to be automatically executed by a
test-roboter in order to check the correct electrical behavior of the device.
Although digital circuits get more frequently used today, at least many
German railway systems are still controlled by relay blocks. In order to gua-
rantee a suÆciently high level of safety, these devices need regular mainte-
nance, and in particular, a re-certication of every single physical device is
required within regular time intervals.
2.1 The Relais Master |A Safety Critical AI Tool
The Relais Master automates the time-consuming and error prone manual
test-plan construction. The system has been developed by the German com-
pany DTK (Hamburg) in cooperation with the Laboratory for Articial In-
telligence (LKI) at the University of Hamburg, Germany. After scanning the
circuit, the engineer transforms it into an internal graph representation, and
the system then generates a set of measurements between terminal contacts of
the device (the test-plan). Each measurement is augmented with information
about the required state of relay contacts (open or closed). The test roboter
will later pneumatically switch the relays. We have the following requirements
for the generated test-plan:

It should be complete for the circuit, i.e., contain every test necessary to
detect any combination of any number of defects in the device (soundness).

It should be \good" in the sense that it does not require too many relay
switching operations, because the maintenance interval is mainly triggered
by the estimated number of switches (quality).
3
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The rst property is safety-relevant, whereas, fortunately, the second is
not, although it is as important for practical usability and makes the use of
AI techniques adequate for the problem. But for safety we only need so-
undness. In fact, this observation is crucial to our checker-based approach:
Soundness can quite easily be checked for a given test-plan, whereas the test-
plan generation is complicated and has to assure quality as well.
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Fig. 1. A sample circuit. Relais R
1
has two contacts, c
1
and c
2
, and R
2
has contacts
c
3
and c
4
. If R
1
is not excited (released), contact c
1
is closed (i.e., is to conduct),
whereas c
2
is open (i.e., is to isolate). Topological connectors are abstractions from
wiring and soldering, for n ports, at least n  1 connections have to conduct.
The input of the Relais Master is a circuit description which actually is
manually constructed from a scanned circuit plan. Figure 1 shows a very
small example. The Ascii-representation of the internal object-oriented Relais
Master data structure is a Lisp-s-expression of the following form:
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The rst sub-list contains the contacts and terminals, the second is the
graph structure of the circuit (every single node is followed by the list of
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direct neighbors), and the third list is the set T of measurements, which are
conduction (con) or isolation (iso) tests between two terminals |for instance
between t
3
and t
4
| followed by a certain state given by the set of excited and
the set of released relays in that order.
In the following, C will refer to the circuit description (the rst two sub-
lists), and T will refer to the third sublist, i.e., to the test-plan. C represents
the input of the Relais Master, and T represents its output. C and T to-
gether form the input for the correctness predicate check
Q
, which is intended
to be implemented by a program which checks suÆcient conditions for T to
be complete for C.
2.2 The Correctness Requirement
For simplicity, we just consider relay groups that contain terminals, connectors
(wires, soldering points etc.) and relay contacts as elements. Diodes, resistors
and capacitors are left out. The generated test-plan consists of conduction and
isolation tests. Note however, that relay contacts are part of relays, so can
not be switched independently, and the test-roboter can only measure between
terminals (outside connectors). Since later the certication is supposed to be
performed automatically, the generated test-plan and hence the Relais Master
is safety critical. We need the following guarantee:
Every defect of any relay contact, connector or terminal of the physical
device will be detected by at least one measurement of the test-plan.
The combination of the generated tests must assure, if successful, that
every single element is individually tested to work properly, i.e., to conduct
(terminals, connectors and relay contacts) and isolate (relay contacts) if sup-
posed to. In that case, we call the test-plan T complete for the circuit C. The
crucial point is, that this is a partial correctness requirement for the Relais
Master program (R for short): If it successfully generates a test-plan T for a
given circuit C, then we want T to be correct. Let P (C) characterize regular
circuit descriptions, and let Q(T ) dene T to be complete for C. Then we
may formalize the correctness requirement for R by the Hoare-triple
fP (C) g T := R (C) fQ(T ) g :
Partial correctness requirements are typical for tools used in the construc-
tion of safety critical applications. We need not prove that the tool never fails,
but we want to guarantee that any given result is correct, i.e., that the tool is
partially correct w.r.t. the pre- and post-conditions expressing the correctness
requirement for its results.
2.3 Runtime Verication of Results - Getting the Idea
Let us assume a transformational program y := (x) (or  for short) to be
specied by pre- and post-conditions P (x) and Q(y) for inputs x and outputs
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y. Instead of proving the partial correctness
fP (x) g y :=  (x) fQ(y) g
of the program  itself |i.e., if P holds for x, and if  successfully terminates
on x with result y, then Q holds for y| the idea is to modify the program
and add a checker predicate which rejects incorrect results. That is to say, we
construct a suÆcient algorithmic formulation check
Q
of the post-condition Q
and prove
( check
Q
(x; y) = true ) =) Q (y) :
We call this property the checker correctness. It is now a simple exercise
to prove that the modied program 
0
below, which additionally checks the
post-condition and rejects any incorrect result, is partially correct with respect
to P and Q:
fP (x) g y :=  (x) ; if : check
Q
(x; y) then abort  fQ(y) g
Of course we additionally have to guarantee, that running  does not
corrupt check
Q
. In our case, we run a separate checker program on ASCII
representations of x and y, not modifying the expert system at all.
2.4 The Checker and its Verication
In order to exploit the runtime result verication approach we just have to
construct (and to verify) the predicate check
Q
on circuits C and test-plans T
which checks T to be complete for C, i.e., which guarantees that the postcon-
dition Q(T ) holds. Thus, in order to verify the Relais Master expert system
it remains to prove such a check
Q
to be suÆcient to guarantee Q, i.e.,
( check
Q
(C; T ) = true ) =) Q (T ) :
We prove that the checker program returns true only if the measures in
T are suÆcient to guarantee that every contact c
i
in C is individually tested
both to conduct, if it should be closed , and not to conduct, if it should be
open. Terminals and single connections of topological connectors can be seen
as special closed contacts. Note, that for safety it is again suÆcient to prove
partial correctness of the checker, i.e., the checker might fail even if Q holds.
We have to prove, that the test-plan T is complete for the circuit C, if the
checker successfully returns true for C and T .
We cannot go into much detail of the program and the proof. The checker
is a Lisp program. Inputs are s-expressions representing C and T (as in the
above example). C is a graph with nodes for every element, T is a set of
either conduction or isolation tests between two terminals in a given state of
the relay contacts.
A successful conduction test between t
1
and t
2
guarantees one conducting
path (we do not know which), whereas a successful isolation test guarantees
every path to isolate. In both cases, however, this might well be due to a
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defect. The checker proceeds in ve steps:
(i) The circuit representation C is transformed into a handier internal graph
representation.
(ii) Each test in T is replaced by the set of all paths between t
1
and t
2
in C
together with its type.
(iii) Every contact of each path in a test is augmented with the corresponding
should-be-state (open or closed).
(iv) Assuming all tests to succeed, we get true logical propositions about phy-
sical conduction of (sets of) paths in the concrete device; simple logical
transformations give us true propositions about individually tested single
elements.
(v) Finally, we check that indeed every circuit element is individually tested.
If not, the checker aborts.
The checker is written in the subset of applicative Common Lisp supported
by the Boyer/Moore theorem prover ACL2 [24]. More details on the checker
and on the correctness proof can be found in [3,2]. The crucial part (step 4) can
be seen as a problem specic tautology or model checking [7,23]: Successful
hardware-in-the-loop test according to the generated set T of measurements
will guarantee a circuit dependent set of logical formulas expressing conduction
or isolation of paths between terminal contacts to be true, and our checker
program basically checks the particular formula
p
^
l=1
t
l
^
k
^
j=1
tc
j
^
n
^
i=1
(c
closed
i
^ : c
open
i
)
(for all p terminals, k topological connectors and all n relay contacts) to be
a logical consequence of that set of formulas: Every terminal, topological
connector and relay contact conducts if closed, and every relay contact isolates
if open. If so, the set T is complete for the given circuit, i.e., the (nite) set
T of test cases is suÆcient for certication of the devices.
Runtime result verication [13,35] is strongly related to program checking
[4], and our case study is an application in the eld of testing safety critical
devices. However, our main focus is on verication of the checker program that
guarantees correctness of the test case generator (the Relais Master expert
system). In contrast to e.g. [20], where test case generation is based on model
checking, our approach does not rely on particular techniques used in the
expert system itself. Classical verication and also model checking might well
nd their limits for complex (and large) applications. We strongly believe
that (veried) runtime result verication scales up in certain mission critical
domains |not only for safety but also for security. The approach compares
to Necula's proof-carrying code and certifying compilers [32,33], but we check
suÆcient and not only necessary conditions for correctness.
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Compared to the Relais Master expert system, the checker is a recursive
correctness predicate of moderate size written in ACL2 Lisp. Its (partial) cor-
rectness is proved and the proof is mechanically checked by ACL2. However,
in order to guarantee that we can trust test plans generated by execution of
the checked Relais Master, we have to prove safety, i.e., partial correctness,
for the checker executable as well. And this brings us to the second running
example: compiler verication.
3 Trusted Execution of Programs
Compilers are sequential transformational programs. A compiler takes a (syn-
tactical representation of) a source program  2 SL as input and sometimes it
successfully terminates and returns a target program m 2 TL. If so, we hope
that m has something to do with . Actually, we want a guarantee that m is
a correct implementation of . But this needs further explanation and we will
go into some detail on the precise meaning of correct implementation later
(section 4). A practical compiler, however, will fail in most cases. Actually, it
will fail on nearly every source program (with the precise mathematical mea-
ning of nearly every). There are usually innitely many and arbitrarily large
source programs, whereas the compiler will run on a nite machine with hard
resource restrictions.
Thus, with trusted execution on a real machine in mind, we can not hope
to be able to prove that a compiler (executable) will succeed on every proper
source program. But we can prove that if it succeeds and returns a machine
program m, then m is a correct implementation of . The intuition behind
this kind of requirements is crucial to many other transformational programs
as well, like proof checkers, model or equivalence checkers, batch runs that
move our money from one to another account and so on. We accept failures,
but we do not want to see incorrect non-erroneous results [36]. This is in
fact what we often depend on. Not more. In our every day experience using
programs we observe them to fail with a segmentation fault or bus error, for
instance due to lack of memory, a programmer's error, a compiler bug, or a
misuse of an optimizing compiler under wrong assumptions. Although very
annoying, we all live with software errors, but we all hope that the appli-
cation programmers, compiler constructors, operating system designers and
even hardware engineers have been sensible enough to detect and signal any
such runtime error. Undetected errors might have harmful consequences, in
particular if they are intentional, in which case we would call them a virus or
Trojan Horse [9].
As a compiler constructor, we can not relieve the application programmer
from the burden to prove applications correct. We cannot guarantee correct-
ness of implementations for incorrect source programs. Actually we have to
construct the compiler without any knowledge about the intended meaning
of source programs. On the other hand, a compiler can not preserve every
8
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property of the source program. We have to negotiate on a contract between
user, language designer and implementor that involves the concrete descrip-
tion of the concrete language to be implemented, the concrete description of
the target machine, denitions of both which are suÆciently mathematically
exact so that user and implementor can agree on them without misunderstan-
ding. Once such a contract has been negotiated, however, all bets are o for
properties of programs not mentioned in that contract.
3.1 Informal Requirements
Let us collect some requirements for a realistic notion of correct implementa-
tion: It should

handle resource limitations of the target machine,

handle non-determinism of the source program semantics,

allow for optimizations,

allow for trusted execution also of non-terminating reactive programs,

and support full recursion and dynamic data types of source languages.
We often think of source programs to serve as specications of their ma-
chine implementations and thus require that the target program should at
least be as dened as the source program and hence be able to compute every
source program result. That is to say, we require the classical implementation
correctness notion of specication renement like for instance in VDM [22].
On the other hand, we often do not want to see incorrect results computed by
target program executions. That is to say every target program result should
be correct with respect to the source program semantics [36]. If we summarize
these two requirements, the target program should

at least be able to compute every result which the source program species

at most compute correct results w.r.t. the source program semantics
The careful reader will already have realized that, in general, these two
requirements contradict. They only meet in the rare cases where we can
guarantee the target program to be dened if and only if the source program
is, and in case of non-deterministic source program semantics we even would
guarantee the target program to be able to compute every source program
result. Implementations are often more deterministic and less dened than
source programs. It depends on the application domain of user programs if
we prefer a notion of correct implementation which corresponds to the rst or
to the second intuitive requirement.
For the every day programming situation a requirement corresponding to
the second item above is very often the adequate correctness notion. It does
not require well-denedness proofs for source programs and guarantees a well-
placed trust in target computations even if source programs have not been
9
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veried. For this situation we want to formulate the following
Thesis:
We can trust machine program execution if we can guarantee partial cor-
rectness for the machine program with suÆcient mathematical rigor.
Note that to be undened here means not to return any non-erroneous
result, i.e., either to abort with a runtime error or not to terminate at all.
Thus, our intuitive compiler correctness requirement for transformational
programs is to guarantee partial correctness of the generated machine pro-
gram. But we did not yet say what kind of correctness property we expect
for the source program in order to be able to give such a guarantee. This
question actually opens up a deep and subtle discussion on source program
properties which we want to preserve or need for instance for optimization (see
[31,17]). As long as we do not really depend on sophisticated optimizations,
or on a termination guarantee for the target program, partial source program
correctness is suÆcient, which means that we require a correct compiler to
preserve partial program correctness, which is adequate, useful, and provable
also for realistic compiler executables [15,17].
Note that there is a subtle dierence to specication renement or to for-
mer work on compiler verication using ACL2 resp. its predecessor Nqthm
([27,8,28]). J Moore proves in [28], that every non-erroneous result of (the
Piton machine on)  will also be computed by m (on the FM9001), that m
is more dened than . This notion corresponds to the rst intuitive requi-
rement above, easily allows for optimizations, but trusted execution of the
target program m requires total correctness proofs for the source program .
4 Compiler Correctness for Transformational Programs
Let us model the semantics of transformational programs by partial relations
(multivalued partial functions) f  D
i
 D
o
between input domains D
i
and output domains D
o
. Thus f is an element f 2 (D
i
* D
o
) =
def
2
D
i
D
o
.
Data in D
i
and D
o
are considered regular or non-erroneous input/output data
or states. In order to handle irregular data, i.e., nite and innite errors, we
assume that every data domain D is extended by an individually associated
disjoint non-empty error set 
, i.e., D


=
def
D

[ 
 and D \ 
 = ;. For
every transformational program semantics f we assume an extended version
f 2 (D
i


* D
o


)
which we denote with the same symbol f . Errors are nal. No computation
will ever recover from an error
3
. Thus, we require (the extended) f to be
error strict, i.e., f to be total on 

i
and f (

i
)  

o
.
3
Exceptions are not errors in our sense. We think of exceptions as special cases of non-local
regular control ow.
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However, we have to respect a further phenomenon. Errors are of essenti-
ally dierent types. They are either unavoidable and we have to accept them,
or they are unacceptable and thus to be avoided. The implementation has
to guarantee that acceptable errors are signaled and hence do not lead to
unexpected incorrect results, whereas the absence of unacceptable errors has
to be proved by the user, for instance if she/he wants to use an optimizing
compiler which omits array boundary checks. We will allow unacceptable er-
rors to cause unpredictable (or chaotic) consequences. In order to model this
phenomenon, we partition 
 in a non-empty set A  
 of acceptable and a
non-empty set U =
def

 n A of unacceptable or chaotic errors. So we require


i
= A
i

[ U
i
and 

o
= A
o

[ U
o
and a strong error strictness of f , namely that f is total on 

i
and
f (A
i
)  A
o
and f (U
i
)  U
o
:
The error sets 
 are supposed to contain a particular standard error ele-
ment ? which is to model innite computation (divergence). We additionally
require (d;?
o
) 2 f whenever there is a non-terminating (innite) computation
of f starting with d 2 D
i


.
4.1 Correct Implementation
Let f
s
be source and f
t
target program semantics, and let 
i
2 (D
s
i


* D
t
i


)
and 
o
2 (D
s
o


* D
t
o


) be data representation relations between source and
target input and output data. We require both relations, 
i
and 
o
, and their
inverses 
i
 1
and 
o
 1
, to be strongly error strict (in both directions).
D
s
o



o
D
s
i


f
s
f
t
D
t
i


D
t
o



i
Fig. 2. Source and target program semantics f
s
; f
t
and data representations 
i
; 
o
Denition 4.1 (Correct implementation or renement) f
t
is said to be
a correct implementation or renement of f
s
relative 
i
and 
o
and associated
error sets i
( 
i
; f
t
) (d)  ( f
s
; 
o
) (d) [ A
t
o
(1)
holds for all d 2 D
s
i
with f
s
(d)  D
s
o
[ A
s
o
(that is with f
s
(d) \ U
s
o
= ;).
For any target program computation, the outcome d
00
in D
t
o


is either an
acceptable error output in A
t
o
, or there exists a source program computation
that either ends in a (regular) d
0
corresponding to d
00
or that ends with an
unacceptable (chaotic) error output in U
s
o
. That is to say: If f
t
is a correct
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implementation of f
s
, then f
t
either returns a correct result, or an acceptable
error, or, if f
s
can compute an unacceptable error, f
t
may (chaotically) return
any result.
If f
t
correctly implements f
s
relative 
i
and 
o
, we will write 
i
; f
t
w f
s
; 
o
or even shorter just f
t
w f
s
(with a boldface w). We indicate this diagram
commutativity by the diagram in Figure 3 and we can easily prove that we can
D
s
o



o
D
s
i


f
s
f
t
D
t
i


D
t
o



i
f
s
2 Sem
s
:
f
t
2 Sem
t
:
Fig. 3. Commutative diagram expressing correct implementation
compose correct implementation diagrams both vertically and horizontally.
Correct implementation is compositional, which is a very important fact for
practical software engineering and in particular for compiler construction and
bootstrapping (see [17] for details).
It is an important observation, that we can exactly characterize correct
implementation by preservation of relative correctness [37], which generalizes
Floyd's and Hoare's notions of partial respectively total program correctness.
Let f 2 (D
i


* D
o


) be a program semantics and let P  D
i
and Q  D
o
be predicates, i.e., subsets of regular data. f is called (relatively) correct with
respect to (pre- and post-conditions) P and Q, hP i f hQ i for short, i
f(P )  Q [ A
o
(2)
Whenever f is started with an input for which the pre-condition P holds,
then it either terminates with an output which fullls the post-condition Q
or else ends with an acceptable error outcome, like for instance a state re-
presenting a machine resource violation. The following theorem says that f
t
correctly implements f
s
if and only if relative correctness of f
s
implies relative
correctness of f
t
for all pre- and post-conditions P and Q. A proof can be
found in [17], where we also discuss some variations of the notions dened
here.
Theorem 4.2 (Preservation of relative correctness) f
t
correctly imple-
ments f
s
( 
i
; f
t
w f
s
; 
o
) if and only if for all P  D
s
i
and Q  D
s
o
we
have
hP i f
s
hQ i =) h 
i
(P ) i f
t
h 
o
(Q) i :
Relative program correctness generalizes the classical notions of partial or
total program correctness. In order to see this, let f 2 (D
i
* D
o
) be an
original unextended program semantics and let P  D
i
and Q  D
o
be pre-
and post-conditions. f is called partially correct w.r.t. P and Q ( fPg f fQg
for short), if f(P )  Q, i.e., if the following holds for f : Whenever the
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precondition P holds for an input d 2 D
i
and if f(d)  D
o
is dened, then
any d
0
2 f(d) fullls the postcondition Q. And f is called totally correct w.r.t.
P and Q ([P ] f [Q] for short), if f additionally is guaranteed to be dened on
any d 2 P , i.e., if f is partially correct w.r.t. P and Q and the domain dom
f
of f comprises P (that is if additionally dom
f
 P holds).
Let us choose particular error sets A = A
i
= A
o
=
def
fag and U = U
i
=
U
o
=
def
fug with acceptable error element a and unacceptable error element
u for both domains D
i
and D
o
. Hence, 
 = 

i
= 

o
=
def
A

[ U . Note that
? 2 fa; ug. We may now consider ? acceptable (a = ? 6= u) or unacceptable
(u = ? 6= a). In these special cases, relative correctness of the extended f
ext
is equivalent to partial correctness of f
hP i f
ext
hQ i () fPg f fQg
if ? = a is considered acceptable, and it is equivalent to total correctness, if
? = u is considered unacceptable:
hP i f
ext
hQ i () [P ] f [Q ] :
4.2 Preservation of Partial Correctness
Our notion of correct (relative) implementation also generalizes well-known
implementation correctness notions. If we consider ? acceptable in our special
situation, then

ext
i
; f
ext
t
w f
ext
s
; 
ext
o
() 
i
; f
t
 f
s
; 
o
(3)
exactly expresses preservation of partial program correctness, and if we con-
sider ? unacceptable, on the other hand, then preservation of relative cor-
rectness is equivalent to preservation of total correctness (see again [17] for
details).
In particular, if we come back to our earlier remarks, preservation of par-
tial program correctness often suÆces if we want to trust in target program
execution and if we do not depend on sophisticated optimizations. It gives us
a mathematically rigorous guarantee that target programs compute at most
correct results. Hence, preservation of partial correctness ([12,30,29], or L-
simulation [5]) is a practically motivated adequate special case, and according
to (3) above we can easily express it using unextended (partial) relational
semantics as follows:
Denition 4.3 (L-simulation) Let  and m denote source and target pro-
grams with semantics [[  ]]
SL
2 (D
SL
i
* D
SL
o
) and [[m ]]
TL
2 (D
TL
i
* D
TL
o
),
respectively. Then we say that the implementation step  7! m preserves
partial correctness (or that m L-simulates ), if and only if

i
; [[m ]]
TL
 [[  ]]
SL
; 
o
:(4)
That is to say: If the target program m is dened on the representation
of a regular source program input, then the source program  can return a
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corresponding result as well. If  and hence m are deterministic, this means
that  will return the corresponding result.
D
s
o

o
[[ ]]
SL
D
t
o

i
D
s
i
D
t
i
[[m ]]
TL
2 Sem
TL
:
[[ ]]
SL
2 Sem
SL
:
[[m ]]
TL
Fig. 4. Commutative diagram expressing preservation of partial program correctness
From Theorem 4.2 it is clear that preservation of partial correctness is
equivalent to L-simulation as of the previous denition:
Corollary 4.4 (Preservation of partial correctness) An implementation
step  7! m preserves partial correctness if and only if m L-simulates , i.e.,
8 P;Q : ( fP g  fQ g =) f 
i
(P ) gm f 
o
(Q) g )
() 
i
; [[m ]]
TL
 [[  ]]
SL
; 
o
Preservation of relative correctness gives us the necessary means to de-
ne adequate and more elaborate notions of correct implementation also for
realistic correct compilation, not only of preservation of partial correctness,
but also for optimizing compilers where target program inputs have to fulll
additional optimization (total correctness) conditions (do not cause particular
runtime errors) for the target program to run trustworthily [17].
We may compare the previous section to a requirements analysis as of
usual software engineering processes. We might even call it a requirements
analysis in proof engineering for the correctness of compilers. The result is a
mathematical framework which allows us to precisely and also formally express
the theorem(s) which we have to prove in order to call a compiler correct.
5 Proving Compiler Source Level Correctness
Let us now give an example and sketch through a concrete compiler source
level correctness proof which we mechanically ran through the Boyer/Moore
theorem prover ACL2 [24].
In [9,10] we prove preservation of partial correctness for a Lisp compiler,
and we want to give a sketch and some brief remarks on source and target
language, the compiler and its correctness proof. In [9] we dene an abstract
stack machine, and a compiler that generates stack machine code for a small
subset of ACL2. The compiler is written in its own source language so that
we can execute it within ACL2, either directly as an ACL2 function, or after
compilation (into abstract machine code) by executing the machine model and
running the compiled compiler (machine) program on it. The latter simulates
machine execution of compiler executables within ACL2, and the main focus of
14
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[9] has been on that kind of (machine) program execution. We actually proved
formally and rigorously that source level verication is not suÆcient to nally
guarantee correctness and hence trustworthiness of compiler executables. The
compiler correctness proof is part of the most recent ACL2 distributions and
described in detail in [10].
The source language SL is a subset of ACL2 Lisp similar to the language
L3 of rst order mutually recursive functions as of [26], but with s-expressions
s 2 SExpr as (dynamic) data. A program is a list defs of function denitions,
followed by a list vars of input variables and a main program expression.
The (operational) semantics [[  ]]
SL
2 ( SExpr

! SExpr ) is dened by an
ACL2 function evaluate which (deterministically) maps input values to the
result of the main expression after binding the inputs to the input variables. A
termination argument, a natural number n, has been added in order to model
strict partial functions within the ACL2 logic of total recursive functions (see
[10] for more details).
The target language TL is the code of an abstract stack machine. Its
conguration consists of a code part and a separate state stack, which is a
data stack containing Lisp s-expressions. The machine has six machine in-
structions including a subroutine call and a structured conditional. Machine
programs (m) are sequences of (mutually recursive) subroutine declarations
(d) together with a main instruction sequence which is to be executed on
an initial stack after downloading the list of declarations into code. The
semantics [[ prog ]]
TL
2 ( SExpr

! SExpr

) of machine programs is a stack-
transformation dened by stepwise executing machine instructions. It is de-
ned by an ACL2 function execute which executes a program prog on an
initial stack which is supposed to contain input values on top. Again, a ter-
mination argument n is added in order to force the machine to stop execution
after at most n subroutine calls.
The compiler compile-program is written in SL itself. It generates stack
machine code according to the stack principle, i.e., arguments are passed
on the stack and a given expression e is compiled to a sequence of machine
instructions pushing the value of e onto the stack leaving the stack below
invariant. Functions or operators consume (pop) their arguments and push
the result.
SExpr

Sexpr


tos
3 (s; : : :)
3 sSExpr
Sexpr

(evaluate   n)
(execute m  n)
(s
1
; : : : ; s
n
) 2
(s
n
; : : : ; s
1
; : : :) 2

tos
Fig. 5. compile-program preserves partial correctness; the data representation
relation 
tos
relates s-expressions (or s-expression lists) to target machine stacks
which contain the s-expression (list) on top (in reverse order)
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We prove that compile-program preserves partial correctness (Figure 5).
The proof is mechanically checked by ACL2 and the complete ACL2 proof
script is part of the recent ACL2 distribution. For those readers familiar with
ACL2 let us cite the main theorem from [10]:
Theorem 5.1 (Compiler correctness formally in ACL2)
(defthm compiler-correctness-for-programs
(let ((new-stack (execute (compile-program prog)
(append (rev inputs) old-stack) n))
(value (car (evaluate prog inputs n))))
(implies (and (wellformed-program prog)
(defined new-stack)
(true-listp inputs)
(equal (len vars) (len inputs)))
(equal new-stack (cons value old-stack)))))
If the source program is well-formed, and if the target program (applied
to an initial stack containing the correct number of inputs in reverse order
on top) returns a non-erroneous result on top (is defined), then this result is
equal to the semantics (evaluate) of the program applied to the inputs.
The crucial part of the proof is to prove correctness of expression compi-
lation. The correctness theorem for programs above is, after some technical
lemmas, a simple consequence of a similar theorem for correct expression com-
pilation, applied to the main expression of the program. For correct expression
compilation we prove two theorems simultaneously by induction. The rst is
the correctness theorem for forms (or expressions), and the second is the theo-
rem for form lists. Both of them are very similar. Informally, for well-formed
expressions and expression lists in well-formed programs we prove: If the ma-
chine, executed on a compiled expression (list), is dened on a stack for an
n, then the following three conjectures hold:
(1) The semantics of the expression (list) |in the given function environment
and with the free variables bound to their values in the current stack-
frame| is dened for the same n,
(2) the machine returns a new stack with the value(s) of the expression(s)
on top (in reverse order), and
(3) the stack just below the result value(s) remaines unchanged.
The proof is actually a combined computational and structural induction
on the termination argument n and the structural depth of the expression
(in ACL2 terminology this is a well-founded induction on the ordinals). The
induction is suggested by a large admissible ACL2 function which explicitly
lists the entire set of induction hypotheses that we need for the proof to
succeed.
We have to prove a lot of lemmas. Most of them are technical, but some
reect crucial insights necessary to nd the proof. So, for instance, it is inte-
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resting, that we actually have to prove the denedness of the source code se-
mantics and the correctness of the result of machine execution simultaneously
as well. The reason is the conditional. The denedness properties of the con-
ditional inductively depend on the value of the condition. The conditional
needs not be strict in both alternatives, and will not be for instance in re-
cursive denitions. The conditional has actually been the challenging case to
nd the proof, not the function application as the reader might have expected.
Function application is just captured by computational induction, whereas the
conditional crucially inuences the proof structure in the large. But we do not
want to go into further detail. We refer to [9,10] instead.
6 On the Impact of Toy Examples
In a sense, our example above is a toy example compared to the work necessary
for the verication of realistic compilers for practical source programming
languages and real target processors [17]. Our source language is very small,
and the abstract target stack machine code is unrealistically abstract and far
away from the ugly reality of real world processors. In that sense, [10] only
presents an exercise. But the proof is an interesting exercise, and it contributes
to realistic compiler verication in two important respects:

It can be accomplished by the mechanical verication of subsequent com-
pilation phases, so for instance (b) to a stack machine with a linear heap
store (data renement), (c) to linear assembly code, and (d) to real binary
machine code of a concrete processor [15].

In the context of the Verix project on correct compilers [12,15,18], the
proof has been generalized to a mechanical PVS [34] proof of preservation
of partial correctness for a larger imperative source language [6].
The correctness of step (b) has already been proved manually, and the me-
chanical proof is nearly completed [11]. And step (c) and (d) are implemented
[15,16,14] and designed to preserve partial correctness. Thus, in addition to
being a nice exercise, our proof can be seen as part of a medium to large
scale proof eort to provide an initial fully veried compiler executable that
preserves partial source program correctness [15].
In the PVS proof we use structural operational semantics and inductive re-
lations to formalize partial functions. It is interesting, that we can essentially
reuse the proof idea and overall proof structure of the ACL2 proof presented
here: The PVS proof also is by combined structural and computational induc-
tion. In our opinion, this is a good news with respect to proof engineering.
In both respects we benet from the toy example. It shows that such a
proof is manageable in principle, without premature introduction of realistic
complexity; it actually has been the rst mechanical proof of preservation
of partial correctness. And such a proof is necessary in order to provide
a mathematically rigorous proof also of the correctness of binary compiler
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executables. In fact, the latter has been the original motivation for the Verix
compiler correctness project: If we bootstrap compilers, we need a guarantee
of the partial correctness of the generated compiler executable. We need
to handle hard resource limitations of target machines and support for full
recursion and dynamic data types of source languages.
7 Conclusions
Software verication can succeed, although it is often considered hard or even
impossible |in particular for large and complex systems. Mechanical proof
support can help nding proofs (and errors). It may help to redo (or reuse)
proofs after slight modications. And it might establish correctness. But in
the latter case we depend on the prover. Its positive results, i.e., the successful
proofs, should in principle be understandable and/or checkable, manually or
by trusted proof checking programs. Otherwise we would leave a serious gap
in the mechanically supported process of correct software construction and
proof documentation.
Thus, we also have some wishes, in particular with respect to proof checka-
bility and to intuitive modeling: First of all, in order to convince our customers
it is not only necessary that a mechanical proof nally succeeds. Once it does,
the prover should also contribute to a consistent and complete proof documen-
tation. If proofs are not mechanically checkable by trustworthy proof checkers,
they should be readable so that we can check them manually. This is very
similar to programming: It is at the end not suÆcient that a program nally
runs. Once it does, we also need documentation. We need to know and to
communicate why.
The second wish is a bit more technical. Compiler verication deals with
programming language semantics, and very often programs mean partial func-
tions. In ACL2 we modeled them by error strict total functions, which is kind
of tedious and always calls for an additional justication. Similarly in PVS we
use inductive relations, which are also a bit tedious to handle. In both cases
we need informal meta-arguments to justify the formalization. Although we
know about the problems, we sometimes wish to have a logic of partial functi-
ons, and a supporting theorem prover which is as usable and elaborate as the
provers we used so far.
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